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Abstract 
The research focuses on cyber-attacks on cyber-physical systems of the unmanned 
vehicles that are characteristically used in the military, particularly the Air Force. Unmanned 
systems are exposed to various risks as the capacity of cyber attackers continue to expand, 
raising the need for speedy and immediate responses. The advances in military technologies form 
the basis of the research that explores the challenges faced in the timely detection and response 
to cyber-attacks. The purpose of the research is to study the connections between operator 
suspicion and the detection and response to cyber-attacks alongside the identification of theory of 
suspicion as the theoretical framework. The paper further presents the experiment used and the 
interview questions that offer the basis for the recommendations and importance of the research 
while answering the research questions. The conclusion from the literature review, interview, and 
experiment indicates the need for training among operators in the Air Force to reinforce their 
capacity in the detection and response to cyber-attacks and other adverse events that could 
compromise the execution of the mission established for unmanned systems. The research offers 
recommendations that can be implemented by the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) in enhancing 
the security measures of unmanned systems.  
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Trust and Suspicion as a Function of Cyber Security in Human Machine Team (HMT) of 
Unmanned Systems 
 
I. Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
Cyber-attacks on the cyber-physical systems (CPS) of unmanned vehicles are attracting 
significant research interest as emergent threats whose catastrophic impacts have significant 
ramifications on security systems. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are being used more and 
more, particularly by the Saudi military and U.S. military, increasing their investments in 
research and production by more than one hundred percent. The uses for UAVs during missions 
include transportation, armed attacks, reconnaissance, and border surveillance (Wang, Yan & 
Zheng, 2018). The unmanned systems are associated with the provision of reliable, autonomous, 
automated, and timely services targeted at the improvement of national security. The unmanned 
systems are expected to collect and process data that could be important to national security. The 
importance of the systems has contributed to the widening of research regarding possible cyber-
attacks that could compromise the integrity of the information and task that unmanned systems 
are expected to accomplish. 
1.2 Motivation 
 The applications of unmanned systems largely increased since they can be used in gas 
detection, rescue missions, and monitoring hazardous surroundings. The systems also enable 
experts to capture videos and images affected by natural disasters such as floods, hurricanes, and 
earthquakes (Gay, Horowitz, Elshaw, Bobko & Kim, 2017). Cyber-attacks are against data 
integrity and aimed at modifying legitimate data by introducing falsified information onto the 
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sensors. Cyber-attacks refer to developing threats, resulting in interest by martial forces. UAVs 
enable malicious individuals to exploit susceptibility from a distance and obtain information that 
cannot be remotely accessed. Despite the advantages of unmanned systems, the devices 
encounter various risks, especially cyber hacking (Gay, Horowitz, Elshaw, Bobko & Kim, 2017). 
Cyber hackers complete tasks by introducing a raspberry computer, a battery, and wireless 
transmitters into the unmanned system that facilitates the access into the systems via WIFI-
signals.  
However, experts must recognize the infected systems by applying an algorithm based on 
some features such as the type and the number of collected data that will be important in the 
training procedure. Another threat in distorting the availability of network is Denial of Service 
(DoS), which agitate the protocol routine operations (Wang, Yan & Zheng, 2018). With an 
increase in cyber-attacks, the government ought to develop technology to analyze and 
comprehend the preventive measures against threats. Additionally, it is essential to identify the 
risks against technological advancements in unmanned systems, for example, the motor, battery, 
propellers, WI-FI receivers, and Global Positioning Systems (GPS) among others (Kwon, Liu & 
Hwang, 2014). Measures should be implemented on identifying the methods used by hackers to 
access the unmanned systems.  
The research framework places emphasis on the intervention of operations at the right 
moment based on suspicious activities that could threaten the integrity of CPS’ (Gay, Horowitz, 
Elshaw, Bobko & Kim, 2019). Nonetheless, research indicates that operators in the military 
setting are trained to trust the systems as opposed to creating suspicions on their operations (Gay, 
Horowitz, Elshaw, Bobko & Kim, 2019). The suspicion theory is an important framework that 
can be applied to explore the means through which operators detect and create response 
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mechanisms to cyber-attacks that target unmanned systems of ground and aerial vehicles (Gay, 
Horowitz, Elshaw, Bobko & Kim, 2017). UAV systems and unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) 
systems are both prone to various cyber-attacks that could compromise the integrity of the 
mission they are designed to complete (Kwon, Liu & Hwang, 2014).  
The majority of the cyber-attacks are not instantaneous but are characterized as time and 
resource-intensive activities orchestrated by humans and unfold at human speeds. The elements 
of cyber-attacks contribute to the preparation and introduction of safeguards promptly based on 
the preparedness and suspicion of operators (Wang, Yan & Zheng, 2018). As a suitable example, 
the Iranian cyber capabilities were linked to the manipulation and grounding of the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) operated RQ-170 Sentinel drone conducting operations at the Iranian 
border (Gay, Horowitz, Elshaw, Bobko & Kim, 2019). The example magnifies the effects that 
could be linked to cyber-attacks on sensitive unmanned systems used for security purpose and 
the gathering of intelligence. It further highlights the challenges of unprepared operators who 
require high suspicion levels to either avert possible cyber-attacks or minimize the leakage of 
sensitive information in case the ground or aerial vehicle is compromised. The research 
regarding the human component (operator) in cyber-attack detection and response remains scarce 
and continues being developed to ensure operator suspicions can generate the needed response to 
possible cyber-attacks against CPS (Gay, Horowitz, Elshaw, Bobko & Kim, 2019).  
The Suspicion theory, as postulated by Bobko offers the theoretical model applied in the 
research to understand how operators can detect and respond to cyber-attacks on unmanned 
systems (Gay, Horowitz, Elshaw, Bobko & Kim, 2017). The theoretical definition indicates the 
simultaneous state of uncertainty, perceived malintent, and cognitive activity regarding the 
underlying information generated electronically and is collated, analyzed, sent, or implemented 
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by an external agent (Gay, Horowitz, Elshaw, Bobko & Kim, 2017). According to the 
framework, it is evident that the state of suspicion among operators is linked to the capacity of 
the Human-Machine Team (HMT) in the response to cyber-attacks. The underlying challenge is 
linked to the design of high-performance HMT in understanding the interactions between 
machines and humans in the working context to minimize the cases of attacks against unmanned 
aerial and ground vehicle systems. 
The literature contributes to the primary goal of the research that shall seek to establish 
the influence of operator suspicion in the detection and response to cyber-attacks against 
unmanned aerial and ground vehicle systems in the context of the HMT. The research will apply 
suspicion theory as the guiding framework in the investigation and understanding of the 
interaction between humans (operators) and machines in averting cyber-attacks on the unmanned 
vehicles. The use of different scenarios will be insightful in understanding the importance of 
operator suspicion in the determination of the response to possible and ongoing attacks. The 
results from the study will be important in guiding military operations and filling the existing gap 
among military operators who have the capacity to trust and not become suspicious.  
1.3 Problem Definition 
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) have often experienced cyber-attacks that have drawn 
attention to how such utilities as unmanned vehicles can be more secured. Specific attention has 
been paid to their human operators, which is the case mostly in the US military where unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs) or drones have been increasingly used for missions (Wang, Yan & Zheng, 
2018). These unmanned systems can be compromised as they are remotely operated and use 
sensors whose signals can be interfered with electronically to give falsified information to 
surveillance agencies such as the military. Operator suspicion presents a scenario in which the 
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threat of cyber hacking of the UAVs is detected (Gay, Horowitz, Elshaw, Bobko & Kim, 2017). 
Through such systems as DoS (Denial of Service) and GPS (Global Positioning System), 
operators can identify security risks and try to mitigate against them (Wang, Yan & Zheng, 2018; 
Kwon, Liu & Hwang, 2014). This research problem emphasizes on such timely intervention to 
address suspicious activities noted by operators on these UAVs, although training of military 
personnel is more towards trust than suspicion of such systems (Gay, Horowitz, Elshaw, Bobko 
& Kim, 2019). The suspicion theory according to Gay, Horowitz, Elshaw, Bobko and Kim 
(2017) will be used for the theoretical grounding to gain an understanding of the manner in 
which operators can detect, as well as respond to cyber-attacks on these UAVs, even as the 
cognitive load that they face is explored to establish the impact on their perceptions and 
performance on the job as elucidated by Paul and Dykstra (2017). 
1.4 Research Questions 
The current study is based on research questions that focus on the critical analysis of 
operator suspicion and trust in the cybersecurity of unmanned systems, with the final set of 
questions explored a pertinent suspicion dimension and how it affects the perceptions of 
operators and their work performance.  
The focus research questions (denoted as FRQ) that I focused on were as follows: 
 FRQ1: What is the significance of operator suspicion and the detection and response to 
cyber-attacks on unmanned vehicles? 
 FRQ2: How do trust and suspicion relate to each other? Are they at opposite ends of the 
same construct, or do they act independently of each other? 
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The other questions (denoted as SQ – Supplemental Question) that supplemented the 
FRQs went further to explore dimensions of suspicion theory with focus on an aspect that is 
pertinent to operators of the security systems. 
 SQ1: How do the dimensions of suspicion (uncertainty, malintent, cognitive activation) 
relate to operator performance?  Which dimensions have the largest impact on operator 
performance? 
 SQ2: How do the dimensions of suspicion impact cognitive workload?  How is cognitive 
workload affected by suspicion, trust, and personality? 
1.5 Hypotheses  
Related to the focus research questions are the following hypotheses or focus research 
hypotheses (FRH) even as majorly based on Gay, Horowitz, Elshaw, Bobko and Kim (2017), as 
well as Gay, Horowitz, Elshaw, Bobko and Kim (2019) 
 FRH .1.1: Operator suspicion is significant in detection of cyber-attacks on UAVs. 
 FRH .1.2: Detection is positively linked to the speediness of response to the suspicious 
activity. 
  FRH.2.1: Trust and suspicion are related. 
 FRH.2.2: They are inversely related as opposite ends of the same construct. 
Related to the supplemental questions were the following hypotheses, marked as SH – 
supplemental hypothesis addressing the aspect of cognitive load in suspicion theory as per Gay, 
Horowitz, Elshaw, Bobko and Kim (2017), as well as Paul & Dykstra (2017). 
 SH.1.1: The three dimensions of suspicion negatively affect operator performance. 
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 SH.1.2: Operator performance is largely impacted by cognitive load. 
 SH.2.1: Cognitive workload is increased by having to differentiate suspicion and trust. 
 SH.2.2: Personality of the operator towards being highly suspicious or highly trusting 
positively increase cognitive workload.  
1.6 Organization of the Dissertation 
The dissertation will be organized and structured under various chapters as follows; 
Chapter 2: Literature review on cyber-attacks, suspicion theory, and the application. Chapter 3: 
Methodology that identifies the research design, provides an interview with one of the students 
in AFIT from the system engineering department, and experimentation used in answering the 
research questions. Chapter 4: Results and Discussion outlining the results from the study, 
discussion based on the literature available on the topic, and the limitations of the research. 
Chapter 5: Conclusion that offers a summary, and the recommendation for future research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
II. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter offers a synthesis of existing literature discussing and detailing various 
issues, concepts, and definitions related to the subject of operator suspicion and detection as the 
response to cyber-attacks on unmanned systems. This chapter offers a refined review of the 
literature that relates to the study hypotheses and helps answer the research questions about 
suspicion theory.  
2.2 Background 
Security issues that face unmanned systems particularly the UAVs and UGVs have been 
at the center of the attention of industry and researchers. The interest in preserving the integrity 
of the security of the unmanned systems shows a link to the increase in the number of attacks 
that target the systems, including jamming communications, injecting wrong data, and disturbing 
network operations (Sedjelmaci, Senouci & Messous, 2016). Unmanned aerial and ground 
vehicles, or drones, are increasingly important and serve a range of functions including 
surveillance and combat missions. UAVs and UGVs carry and collect or communicate sensitive 
information for the attacks (Jamshidi, Jaimes Betancourt & Gomez, 2011). The United States 
Army, Navy, and Air Force rely heavily on UAVs and UGVs to complete dangerous and 
traditionally exhausting manned missions to make them more feasible (Kim, Wampler, Goppert, 
Hwang & Aldridge, 2012).  
The use of unmanned systems which was largely relegated to surveillance and 
reconnaissance operations has shifted as the government now use the systems for offensive 
purposes and other missions. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) expects that more than 
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30,000 drones will be flying in the country by 2020 (Paganini, 2019). Usage of the vehicles 
contributes to research concerns regarding the security of the unmanned systems that could be 
hacked and controlled by attackers that operate in complex environments compromising the 
mission. The majority of the cyber-attacks are not instantaneous with the push of a button but 
rather are resource and time-intensive activities that are carried out by humans and unravel at 
human speeds (Paganini, 2019).  
The time and resources required by the adversary have a direct correlation and proportion 
to the quality and level of defenses employed on the network. Notably, the importance of 
considering the human element associated with cyber-attacks on unmanned systems cannot be 
overstated based on the arguments regarding the nature and ways of perpetrating attacks (Gay, 
Horowitz, Elshaw, Bobko & Kim, 2019). Human vulnerabilities pose some of the greatest risks 
that could lead to attacks enhancing the need for examining the topic of operator suspicion and 
detection (Gay, Horowitz, Elshaw, Bobko & Kim, 2019). According to Hirshfield et al. (2015) 
the importance of examining human errors in the cyber domain cannot be overlooked. While the 
majority of the cyber-warfare related research has concentrated on the effects of cyber-attacks on 
the targeted computer systems, it is important to consider the role of human operators during 
cyber breaches (Hirshfield et al., 2015). 
However, businesses must align response policy with an institution’s values and 
responsibilities in handling an attack. For example, when Arabian-American Oil Company 
(ARAMCO) was hacked, as soon as the company was aware of the hacking event, the company's 
electronic systems were wholly isolated and stopped from the outside as an early precautionary 
measure taken with the start of the emergency damage that hit some sectors of its electronic 
network, which is suspected to be caused by the entry of a virus into a number of personal 
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computers in the company without being able to hit the main components of the network. I know 
the example is not related to the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) but they share a strong concept 
between them which is Operator suspension and detection toward the system that has been 
hacked while observing. Both examples will let me study more how Operator should be aware of 
situation. 
2.3 Suspicion Theory 
Failure and System errors that have been predicted by Operator may occur during system 
run so in this case, full mission capable and stability of the system are not guarantee. Cyber-
attack does not have a specific time of occurrence so it may occur at any time. The operator must 
also believe that any attack may occur in times that are considered quiet, normal or what do you 
call a perfect day. Aramco example is the most significant proof of that, it was attacked where 
most of the IT employees are on leave. Therefore, Operator must always be caution of satiation 
awareness of the whole operation, and full readiness of reaction with speed for any strange event 
occurs like failure and errors in system or system of system such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
(UAV) and Ground Control Station (GCS). 
The major emphasis regarding operator suspicion and threat detection concerns the need 
for interventions at the appropriate time based on the identification of suspicious activities that 
could pose threats to the integrity of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). However, the operators in 
the military, for example, receive training on the need for trusting the system as opposed to the 
necessity of creating suspicions that could be used to deal with possible threats that might affect 
the system (Gay, Horowitz, Elshaw, Bobko & Kim, 2017). Therefore, research highlights the 
importance of anchoring operator suspicion on training, particularly among military operators 
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based on Suspicion Theory as the main and guiding theoretical framework (Gay, Horowitz, 
Elshaw, Bobko & Kim, 2017).  
Suspicion Theory, as discussed on the security of unmanned systems, addresses the need 
for operators to be keen and alert to possible attacks as a means of ensuring they can detect and 
create the appropriate responses to cyber-attacks. Further, suspicion theory is premised on the 
majority of the attacks being time and resource-intensive; therefore, the emphasis on need for 
suspicion and training for detection of suspicious activities that could threaten the integrity of the 
system could lead to improved operator detection and aversion of threats (Gay, Horowitz, 
Elshaw, Bobko & Kim, 2017). The available literature on suspicion theory indicates the need for 
training as the anchor to improve responses and measures against impending attacks on the 
unmanned systems that could empower the activities of hackers (Gay, Horowitz, Elshaw, Bobko 
& Kim, 2017).  
2.4 Constructs and Application of Suspicion Theory  
Indicators of an attack include anti-malware programs, system administrators reporting 
indications of a breach, and suspicious activity with operating services and different users. Upon 
detection of an attack, IT experts must control the damage by disconnecting system access for 
computers infected by malware and setting up security measures to eliminate network 
vulnerability (Manesh & Kaabouch, 2019). The application of suspicion theory illustrates a way 
to assist in comprehending operator performance in circumstances that entail malicious 
objectives such as a cyber-attack (Manesh & Kaabouch, 2019). A study by Manesh & Kaabouch 
(2019) was conducted to apply suspicion theory in surveying how operators identify and respond 
to cyber-attacks against unmannered systems. The operator suspicion ought to be controlled for 
the human-machine to achieve better results based on detecting cyber-attacks, and develop 
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appropriate responses when the unmannered systems are exposed to attacks (Manesh & 
Kaabouch, 2019).For example, Iran provides a case of the challenges possibly associated with 
cyber-attacks as its capabilities were linked to the grounding of RQ-170 Sentinel drone operated 
by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and commissioned to conduct activities at the Iranian 
border for security purposes (Gay, Horowitz, Elshaw, Bobko & Kim, 2019). As part of the 
example, it is important to note that unmanned systems could have great impacts on security if 
they are manipulated and land on the wrong hands. Notably, the leakage of sensitive information 
or diversion of the unmanned system could be used to the advantage of cyber attackers. 
However, research on the human aspects of the operators related to cyber-attack detection 
remains insufficient but continues to be the center of attention with suspicion theory being 
developed as the leading theoretical component to deal with the attacks on unmanned systems 
(Gay, Horowitz, Elshaw, Bobko & Kim, 2019).  
The theoretical framework was advanced by Bobko and serves as the tool for 
understanding the means through which operators can facilitate the detection and response to 
cases of cyber-attacks on the unmanned systems used for different operations (Gay, Horowitz, 
Elshaw, Bobko & Kim, 2017). The framework indicates the uncertainty associated with cyber-
attacks and the need for vigilance as the solution to impending attacks stopped by operators 
through the collection, analysis, and enforcement of barriers against intrusion (Gay, Horowitz, 
Elshaw, Bobko & Kim, 2017). The framework further indicates the state of suspicion as being 
the inherent capacity of the Human-Machine Team (HMT) that facilitates the response to cyber-
attacks. Hence, it is important to consider the design of high-performance HMT as the means of 
understanding the connection between humans and machines (unmanned systems) as the means 
of minimizing the risks associated with cyber-attacks. 
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Both empirical and conceptual research, using quantitative and qualitative methods, 
examine the role of operator suspicion in detecting and responding to cyber-attacks on unmanned 
systems such as is the case with drones. These have provided theoretical and 
empirical/experimental evidence on the workings of suspicion theory in informing human 
operators’ response to cyber threats. Suspicion theory itself works as a good source point from 
which the relationships in the model can be explained since it links the cues to the filters, and 
ultimately the immediate derivatives and outcomes. 
2.5 Human Factors and Suspicion are related to the Effects of Cyberattacks   
Human-level factors play different roles when attacks are perpetrated leading to the need 
for exploring suspicion and detection as the means of averting impending attacks. Cyber security 
is one of the leading and important issues associated with unmanned systems, particularly aerial 
ones whose functions are heavily dependent on the onboard automation and intervehicle 
communications (Kwon, Liu & Hwang, 2014). The Unmanned Aerial Vehicles are operated 
remotely or in other incidences flown using automated piloting and face the same vulnerabilities 
that unmanned systems are exposed to (Kwon, Liu & Hwang, 2014). Cyber-attacks that target 
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) and unmanned vehicles are emergent threats that carry with them 
catastrophic risks and impacts that could affect the activities of military agencies as the major 
users of the unmanned vehicles (Gay, Horowitz, Elshaw, Bobko & Kim, 2017). 
Cyber hackers may turn to information breach by generating software to destroy a 
system’s program. Infringement on data might greatly affect the security of a system when the 
attackers have sufficient data to carry out deceptive activities. Examples of cyber-attacks on 
unmannered aerial systems include: 
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 Jamming is an unwanted signal that leads to the blurring of real information or 
the fallacy or deception or concealment of such information. The source of such 
interference may be natural due to electromagnetic phenomena such as multi-
track interference or industrial interference planned by the enemy. 
 Message deletion where the hacker detects the messages sent from the operator to 
the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and deletes them before reaching the UAV, 
or the hacker prevents the signals and messages sent from the UAV to the 
operator in the ground. 
 GPS spoofing is considered an attack where a radio transmitter is used close to 
the target by applying signals to interfere with the GPS signals, which means that 
they can be intercepted and controlled. 
  Fault injection by intruder. 
The attacks may result in collisions of systems providing aircraft controllers falsified 
information. However, the government might respond to criminal activities by making certain 
experts follow the best criteria when setting up passwords for example. Further, frequent 
checkups of passwords may prevent the cyber attackers from access into the unmanned systems. 
IT experts ought to develop a plan that entails team members who will be involved in 
communication and implementing tasks to be undertaken in responding to cyber-attacks 
(Jamshidi, Jaimes Betancourt & Gomez, 2011). Further, the plan ought to be specific to 
individuals who could cover the operations in the event the assigned member is unavailable. 
Every person on the team must bring an exclusive institutional perspective, which will be 
essential in addressing the consequences of cyber-attacks.  
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Identifying cyber-attack is not easy at any jobs during observing operation. Training 
Operators of situation awareness with a perfect alert notification can be one of the solution to 
detect early clue in any security job. However, automated alarms are essential in recognizing 
intrusion into the systems and the source of the infringement (Jamshidi, Jaimes Betancourt & 
Gomez, 2011). Nevertheless, experts have to recognize the infected systems by applying an 
algorithm based on features such as the type and the number of collected data that will be 
important in training procedure. Another threat in distorting the availability of network is Denial 
of Service, which agitate the protocol routine operations. With an increase in cases of cyber-
attacks, the government ought to develop technology in order to analyze and comprehend the 
preventive measures against threats. Additionally, it is essential to identify the risks against 
technological advancements in unmanned systems, for example, motor, battery, propellers, WI-
FI receivers, and the Global Positioning Systems (GPS) amongst others (Ji, Niu & Shen, 2016). 
Measures ought to be implemented on identifying the methods used by hackers to access the 
unmanned systems and setting up the appropriate responses to cyber-attacks (Ji, Niu & Shen, 
2016). Administration’s response to cyber-attacks may escalate an incident, thus it is important 
for the management to identify procedures that are less costly, time efficient, as well as events 
that protect an organization’s reputation. 
Another response to cyber-attacks entails involvement of government in the investigation 
team. Further, an organization must align response attempts with security management and IT 
initiatives. Cyber security crews generate and implement methods of identifying, supervising, 
and responding to a cyber-crisis (Manesh & Kaabouch, 2019). In case of a cyber-attack, an 
investigation team must recognize grounds for breach and methods of containing the 
infringement.  
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Another significant way to respond to attacks involves the use of an intrusion detection 
system, which examines system attacks on unmanned aerials. Organizations must develop 
strategies to prevent and respond to cyber-attacks by implementing the best cyber security. 
Another response to cyber-attacks is comprehending the reason behind the infringement and 
focus attention on attacker’s motives. On suspicion of a planned cyber-attack, an organization 
must establish recovery plans for all procedures and provide maximum support to existing 
technology (Moga, Boscoianu, Ungureanu, Sandu & Boboc, 2016). Companies with formulated 
cyber threat strategy where each member is familiar with their responsibilities, have increased 
chances of rising back after an attack. 
As highlighted, unmanned vehicles are used for various purposes and missions that 
include border surveillance, reconnaissance, and armed attacks. The systems are effective as they 
reduce the overreliance on physical deployment of service personnel in areas of conflict or other 
parts of the globe that could require monitoring. The systems provide an array of information and 
contribute invariably to the provision of autonomous, timely, automated, and reliable services 
that contribute towards the improvement of national security (Wang, Yan & Zheng, 2018). Some 
security measures and tools exist including intrusion detection systems that are applied to avert 
possible attacks on the machines. However, the use of security tools does not deal with the threat 
from the human perspective that could be addressed by considering the human element as the 
weakest link in a system (Fan, Lwakatare & Rong, 2017).  
2.6 State Suspicion Model 
The necessity of a conceptual framework cannot be overstated with the target of IT 
suspicion being covered in a three-stage process model that indicates the state-level of suspicion. 
As demonstrated in Figure 1 below, state suspicion is understood based on multiple phases that 
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recognize the application of cognitive activity, uncertainty, and perceived malintent that 
facilitates the minimization of the risks associated with cyber-attacks (Bobko, Barelka & 
Hirshfield, 2013). 
 
Figure 1: State-Level IT Suspicion (Bobko, Barelka & Hirshfield, 2013) 
   
 
PHASE I: Cues that exist in the Environment 
The three dimensions of suspicion are prevalent in the literature, although not explicitly 
mentioned, they are alluded to in the studies touching on operator suspicion in the detection of 
cyber threats in unmanned systems. For example, Clarke (2014) establishes some of the cues 
from the suspicion model regarding patterns of negative discrepancy when civilian drones are 
increasingly being used for malicious purposes and even enemy surveillance, which defeats their 
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original purpose and raises suspicion among vigilant cybersecurity operators (Bobko, Barelka & 
Hirshfield, 2013). The variables of human behavior and activity characteristics in cyberspace 
have consistently shown up where operator suspicion has been mentioned, even as studies 
explore the human interface in cybersecurity operations. The cues include the pattern of negative 
discrepancies, system and interface characteristics, and missing information that deals with trust 
in IT systems.  
PHASE II: Filters/ Individual Difference Determinants 
Individual differences are associated as being critical in the increase or inhibition of state-
level suspicion. For example, when a user displays trust in automation and IT services, there is a 
decreased chance of suspicion.  When there is a lack of trust, it enhances the potential for 
suspicion contributing to the detection of possible cyber-attacks (Bobko, Barelka & Hirshfield, 
2013). Moreover, the filters of training and rewards have been mentioned in studies, even as they 
link these to the immediate derivatives and outcomes of increased cognitive loads for human 
operators of cybersecurity. Despite growing efforts to foster an understanding of the intersection 
between humans and the cyberspace, there have been pertinent challenges in cybersecurity 
research. The presumption of the inscrutability of cyber technologies has created a sense of 
resignation, almost suggesting that cyber danger is beyond the ability of scholars to understand 
(Kello, 2013). In the third dimension, the cognitive load increment stands out, which is why most 
studies seem to refer to cognitive modeling as a way of addressing the multi-disciplinary 
cybersecurity challenges highlighted in human and computational sciences. 
Phase III: Increased Cognitive Workload and How That Affects Perceptions and 
Performance on the Job  
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The human factor is very critical to the performance of any job and for the success of any 
operational activity. Since human beings use their mental capacities and are mandated to employ 
critical thinking in their different areas of work, they often bear a cognitive workload, which has 
the potential of affecting their perceptions and performances on the job. According to Paul and 
Dykstra (2017), little work or research on the human factor on cyber operations has been carried 
out despite being abundant in other mission-critical systems such as air traffic control, as well as 
cyber operations. Cybersecurity operations are regarded as a mission-critical service in the 
securing of organizations, companies, and even countries while ensuring business continuity. 
Evolving technology, coupled with threats to the network has increasingly made cybersecurity 
operations high-value, difficult, and quite complex (Paul & Dykstra, 2017). Similar to any other 
system, the complexity of tasks in the resultant high-risk environment is bound to take a toll on 
the human operators, often leading to judgment errors, burnout, and decreased performance. 
According to a comprehensive study of tactical cyber operations at the National Security Agency 
(NSA), operator fatigue, frustration, as well as cognitive workload increase significantly over the 
course of an operation inducing larger error margins and risk of attack (Paul & Dykstra, 2017).  
The cybersecurity environment is one that poses considerable high risks in operation with 
failure or success, often affecting the mission and reputation of service providers adversely or 
positively. Paul and Dykstra (2017) assert that despite the heavy focus of cybersecurity 
operations’ research and development on technology for the achievement of more secure 
enterprises, human experts are deemed as playing the most crucial role in deploying, configuring, 
monitoring, and operating the networks. The NSA often engages in the recruitment and hiring of 
computer network operators charged with defending US military networks and exploiting foreign 
adversaries’ networks (Paul & Dykstra, 2017). These jobs require persons with competencies 
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such as problem-solving and critical thinking skills, digital forensics, intrusion detection and 
incident response, network penetration testing, as well as operating systems and network 
analysis. The fact that new operators ought to complete extensive training for the satisfaction of 
ongoing skills’ certification, means that the often-witnessed early career burnout and turnover are 
quite costly for companies and the government. Cyberspace operations such as command and 
control are regarded as highly demanding cognitive domains that contribute to the highest 
workloads. Such cognitive workload that entails executing various offensive and defensive 
cyberspace operations in support of military objectives may hinder sound judgment and cause an 
escalation of cybersecurity threats. 
Cognitively demanding tasks are prevalent in the cybersecurity operations and demand 
the use of the human operator’s visual perception, memory, and attention. They often create a 
cognitive workload that leads to increased fatigue and errors, which may reduce or impair 
operator suspicion of malicious activity and lead to an unprecedented, damaging, adverse event 
in the cyberspace. For example, the friendly fire incidents among US troops in the Gulf War of 
1991 were established as being propagated by anxiety and stress, coupled with poor situational 
awareness (Paul & Dykstra, 2017). The cybersecurity tasks require vigilance that is also 
associated with cognitive workload, and due to the length of these tasks in terms of time needed 
to keep watch, the human operators increasingly suffer from fatigue and stress that leads to errors 
in perception of threat risk, as well as reduced performance. Judgment is often compromised 
under stress and a heavy cognitive workload, which means that the human operators may fail to 
identify or establish suspicious cyber activities that amount to cybersecurity threats and 
propagate attacks. Mental exhaustion, in any field of work, regardless of the rewards has been 
associated with impaired task performance and the same conceptualization can be applied to the 
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cyberspace. In fact, occupational stress for the human operators as they seek to detect and deter 
cyber-attacks, leads to cognitive overloads, especially where unmanned crafts and systems are in 
the security space and pose increased threats or real-time attacks that can escape the fatigued 
operator’s suspicion. 
The sparse literature on cognitive workload in cyber defense shows that the length of 
vigilance demanded for the completion of tasks is mostly responsible for affecting perceptions 
and performance on the job. A lot of concern has been expressed regarding operators who play a 
tactical role and are closest to the defense network since they take on the highest risk from 
complex tasks to adversary skill and knowledge that may overwhelm them mentally (Dykstra & 
Paul, 2015). With the amount of cognitive workload that is demanded as operators interact with 
machines, it is unfortunate that this human factor then forms a weak link in cybersecurity, 
making the systems more vulnerable to attack. The assertion here is that in spite of the training 
and recruitment of cyberspace operators, the complex environment in which they work and the 
overwhelming cognitive workload might interfere with their capacity to recognize the threats and 
cause a human error that will facilitate a cybersecurity incident (Dawson & Thomson, 2018). 
There are many facets of daily life over which the cyber domain is responsible and the 
complexity of the cyberinfrastructure, as well several vulnerable devices, continues to grow 
exponentially. These attributes of the cyberspace have meant heavier mental or cognitive 
workloads on the cybersecurity workforce that supports this infrastructure while defending the 
networks, calling for more studies on the impacts of such workloads and the possible solutions. 
In the definition of work roles and training in cybersecurity, the Department of Homeland 
Security’s National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers and Studies (NICCS) developed the 
Cybersecurity Workforce Framework, which although providing a base set of work roles for the 
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cybersecurity workforce, does not foster teamwork or collaborations (Dawson & Thomson, 
2018). The void space in the sharing of aptitudes, skills, and knowledge in the cybersecurity 
workforce has also contributed to enormous cognitive workloads on individuals, reducing their 
alertness to suspicious activity and increasing the likelihood of cyber-attacks. According to 
Dykstra and Paul (2015), operator stress has increasingly become commonplace, propagated by 
the persistent and disabling effects of cyber operations and heavy cognitive workloads. Operator 
stress and the subsequent employee burnout have become important risk factors in the 
performance of cybersecurity workers and the safety of the systems they are manning. 
Cybersecurity is increasingly being regarded as a high-risk, high-reward profession that can 
negatively impact its technical workforce or operators manning the systems, through excessive 
workload pressures that may deter their capacity to detect malicious activity in the cyberspace 
and cause cyber-attacks (King et al., 2018). Therefore, as humans design and execute 
cybersecurity programs, they should factor in the spread of the cognitive workload to ensure that 
it is equitably shared among workers manning the tactical cyber operations. 
The ease of measurement of operator error and mission success has shed light on the 
importance of considering operator fatigue, frustration, and cognitive workload since they can 
contribute to technical errors or personnel burnout and eventually increase cybersecurity risk 
events (Paul & Dykstra, 2017). Most of the literature on this subject shows that cognitive 
workload that also occasions operator stress is the cause for constant staff turnover and this may 
cause a shortage in cybersecurity workers and heighten inexperience that distorts operator 
suspicion. If the workers cannot stay long enough on the job due to stress and fatigue, then none 
will ever be experienced enough to automatically suspect when things are wrong in the 
cyberspaces they are manning. This problem points to the need for urgency when addressing 
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cognitive workloads in the cybersecurity workspace to ensure that performance of the job is 
maintained at high-efficiency levels and abnormal situations are arrested as fast as possible to 
restore normalcy in the organization’s or nation’s cyberspace. According to Paul and Dykstra 
(2017), a consistent, measurable factor about an operation is its length, which matters and ought 
to be considered because it affects operators regarding long-term fatigue, frustration, stress, as 
well as cognitive wear and tear that ultimately leads to burnout and turnover. Human factors are 
critical to the success of missions, and operator efficacy should be increased through a wider 
distribution of the cognitive workload or mental processes entailed in the cybersecurity 
operations. 
2.7 Propositions from Suspicion and Trust Research  
This study makes pertinent reference to literature reviewed and from which pointed to the 
different definitions and explanations of trust and suspicion. Trust and suspicion research 
surrounding security systems operators cuts across numerous disciplines including military 
studies, aviation safety, air traffic control, and cyber research in general. From these key studies 
that contain the main theories surrounding trust and suspicion, the following propositions were 
established: 
 Operators of unmanned systems should use their suspicion to detect any malicious 
activity that can lead to cyber-attacks 
- (Gay, Horowitz, Elshaw, Bobko & Kim, 2017) 
 Suspicion is confirmed through expert recognition of systems whose security integrity 
has been compromised 
- (Wang, Yan & Zheng, 2018; Kwon, Liu & Hwang, 2014) 
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 Operator suspicion aids in the development of interventions to secure such cyber-physical 
systems as unmanned vehicles 
- (Gay, Horowitz, Elshaw, Bobko & Kim, 2019) 
 Trust can be an issue, such as in the military, since operator trust reduces suspicion level 
and presents room for surprise cyber-attacks 
- (Gay, Horowitz, Elshaw, Bobko & Kim, 2019) 
 As suspicion increases the cognitive load of operators, they may falter in their 
perceptions and efficiency of performance on the job 
- (Dykstra & Paul, 2015; Paul & Dykstra, 2017) 
These propositions were pertinent in the definition of the problem and formulation of 
research questions, and more so, the hypotheses as trust and suspicion are explored in the 
literature review that establishes the theoretical foundations of the same in operations 
surrounding cybersecurity. 
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III. Methodology and Design of Experiment 
 
3.1 Chapter Overview 
The chapter offers a description of the methodology and experimental design applied in 
addressing the hypotheses and research questions from chapter 1. The chapter offers insights 
regarding the models applied in the analysis of different variables regarding the application of 
the theory of suspicion related to operator detection and the response to the possible cyberattacks 
on unmanned systems. The chapter also provides an interview with one of the students in AFIT 
from the system engineering department, and his job was a Ground Control Station Operator 
(GCSO) in his team. Hence, the chapter describes the tests applicable in ascertaining the 
relationship between the various variables and the link to the theory of suspicion as identified.  
3.2 Methodology 
The focus of the research is linked to the evaluation of the relationship between the 
detection and ensuing response to cyberattacks on unmanned systems and the role of operator 
suspicion. As identified earlier, suspicion can be broken down into three distinct components that 
include perception of malicious intent, increased cognitive activity, and uncertainty. The three 
components occur simultaneously to facilitate suspicion among operators who are then 
responsible for initiating the needed mitigation mechanisms against the attacks on unmanned 
systems. The use of the experimental design for the study provides the needed framework for the 
collection of the data needed in testing the hypotheses and answering the research question. 
3.3 Design of Experiment (DoE) 
Hypothesis testing incorporated data attained from a survey on active duty Air Force 
Squadrons. The US and other distinct locations across the world took part in the survey with 
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3,174 persons from 52 different units taking part in the process. Each of the units contained two 
hierarchical levels in their arrangements. A large number of the squadrons entailed a total of 10-
50 persons. 10% of the total number represented those in leadership positions with a commander 
taking charge of the entire unit. 
The utilization of the Air Force squadrons in testing the proposed hypothesis revolves 
around identified basic reasons. One of the aspects is the hierarchical organization of the military 
ranks acting as a pointer of a person’s level. Besides the organization, the focus on a specific 
mission by the squadrons as supported by the unique structure is another major element. Also, 
military procedures entail individuals traveling temporarily to undertake particular actions and 
strategies and as such incorporate interactions between the leaders and followers. Lastly, the 
military setting is characterized by numerous consistent training sessions leading to advanced 
continuing in the operations. Therefore, the analysis level is an appropriate approach compared 
to theory testing. The variations linked to the constructs of interest is likely to emerge from the 
particular individual unit member differences as opposed to the external factors. The target 
population used in the research study was approved by the Air Force Survey Office, where 
individual squadrons were selected to act as the sample group. The study used 42 to 130 
individuals to collect the necessary data and information. 1,156 military personnel completed the 
survey where the researcher attained a 49.2% response rate. The participants were allocated 
distinct segments with each of the unit controlled by a commander. Each squadron availed an 
average of 30 persons. Notably, 39% of the individuals taking part had been physically separated 
from the supervisor daily. It meant that they no longer had the mandate to perform their tasks.  
The study used the Likert system to accord ranks to all the items. A seven-point Likert-
scale itemized the constructs. Scale 1 showed that an individual strongly disagreed to an 
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approach, while the seven ranking level portrayed that the participant strongly agreed with an 
aspect. All the elements incorporated in the research depicted reliability (e.g., Cronbach’s αo 
> .881). 
The human-in-the-loop experiments were conducted in three stages as elaborated below. 
Stage one entailed obtaining consent from the military, which included collecting personal 
information from the thirty-two military operators. Additionally, the stage also included 
collecting information though demographic data and personality-related questionnaires.  The 
second stage aimed at familiarising the participants with the experimental activities through 
demonstrations and instructions. The stage was necessary in ensuring that an acceptable level of 
fluency was maintained during the operation. The third stage was characterized by randomly 
presenting the participants to a series of eight mission scenarios. Each pair was equipped with a 
pair of mission videos and mission briefings. After completing the mission briefings, the 
participants responded to the videos events that transpired during each mission scenario, where 
the response times and response selection were recorded simultaneously.  
Upon the completion of each mission segment, through NASA TLX and SSI 
questionnaires, the participants’ malicious intent, uncertainty, and cognitive workload during the 
mission was obtained. The mission briefings and mission videos were significant to the operator, 
as they described the mission type, descriptive profiles, and mission context for the unmanned 
ground vehicle system (UGVS) operations. There were two types of mission, training mission, 
and operational mission that involved transport and re-supply. The mission contest was set in the 
Middle Eastern locations or the U.S based on the corresponding estimates of past cyber-attacks. 
The mission profile was critical in configuring the UGV behaviours. After profile deployment, 
the UGVS ran autonomously, which generated mission views for playback to be used in the 
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simulation experiments. Visual and verbal mission scenarios were designed to indirectly 
manipulate the operator’s state-suspicions through generating two independent variables. The 
independent variables were malicious intent and uncertainty that were formed into a two-level 
full-factorial design. 
3.4 Sample and Data Collection 
The orientation briefing was completed before transitioning and tasking the members to 
record and monitor the speed of the Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) after every thirty seconds 
while being alert to the ongoing activities through video and other instrument readouts to identify 
anomalous events based on the mission of the UGV. The detection of any anomalous events 
contributed to the participants being prompted to select and apply the best response from a 
distinct decision tree that offered a range of various operator responses in times of crises. The 
tasks were further closely related and aligned to the typical UVS operator tasks while completing 
questionnaires. The questionnaires completed included the NASA TLX questionnaire that is used 
in the quantification of the operator’s self-assessment based on the cognitive workload on 
various dimensions that are rated on a scale running from 0 to 100. Secondly, a 13-item SSI 
questionnaire was provided for the research to evaluate the perception of uncertainty, malicious 
intent, overall suspicion, and cognitive activation. A 7-point Likert scale was used for the Air 
Force officers where the experiments took between 2 and 2.5 hours as numerous concurrent 
operations were ongoing in the office environment. The findings are represented in the Table 1: 
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Table 1: Elements and Reliabilities 
Element Number of Questions Cronbach’s ɑ (Reliability) 
Trust 16 0.75 
NASA TLX 6 0.839 
Creativity 2 0.57 
Suspicion SSI 13 0.881 
Cognition 18 0.866   
Perception of Consequences 256 0.604 
Perception of Uncertainty 256 0.251 
 
The Interpersonal Trust in a Leader 
The element of trust is important in operator suspicion, and based on McAllister’s (1995) 
eleven items of affect and cognition-based trust scale, it was possible to combine the elements to 
measure the level of trust. The sample items were based on the expression on the shared 
relationship between the operator and the supervisor regarding the ease of sharing ideas, hopes, 
and feelings that represent the affect-based characteristics. On the other hand, the measure was 
based on the supervisor’s track record where the operator could not see a reason to question or 
doubt the competence of the supervisor nor the preparedness for the job as part of the cognition-
based aspect of trust. The Cronbach’s ɑ = .75 supports the conclusions made regarding the 
influence of trust among operators. 
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Justice Climate 
The justice climate was investigated based on Colquitt’s (2001) informational justice, 
interpersonal, and the thirteen procedural items that offer a picture of organizational justice. 
Notably, the referent-shift approach was effective in the creation of the items for testing, 
including questions regarding the handing down of decisions to reach everyone and the treatment 
of people involved in the squadron with dignity. The justice environment was interrogated at the 
unit level as the means of ascertaining the elements that contribute positively to operator 
suspicion. The measure of the justice climate selected for the study was consistent and reflected 
Naumann and Bennet’s (2000) framework that applied procedural justice items alongside the 
inclusion of interactional items that related to the reasons behind various decisions linked to 
individuals. The calculation of the values from the test contributed to a finding of Cronbach’s ɑ = 
0.839. 
Affective Organisational Commitment 
The measures of creativity identified from the test alongside suspicion and cognition 
resulted in Cronbach’s ɑ= 0.57, 0.881, and 0.866 respectively. The results were okay based on 
the number of samples being used and highlight the significance of various elements in raising 
operator suspicion when dealing with threats to unmanned systems. Other areas of interest 
include the perception of the consequences resulting from operator suspicion and obtained a 
Cronbach’s ɑ= 0.604. The perceptions of the uncertainty was low with a score of Cronbach’s ɑ= 
0.251. The scores resulted from the research grading the HMT performance while the time aspect 
indicates the researcher’s grading of the operator response time as the means of mitigating 
against possible adverse effects on the unmanned systems. The calculations were supported by 
various established models as exemplified by the trust in a leader component. The controls 
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employed in the analysis underline the possibility of effect on the development of interpersonal 
trust in a leader the interpersonal trust in a leader differentiation. Notably, it was important to 
understand the significance of the research and effects of operator suspicion in averting possible 
attacks on unmanned systems.  
3.5 Operator Interview 
To provide a brief explanation of my thesis regarding Operator understanding and 
behavior toward operating, I did an interview with one of the students in AFIT from the system 
engineering department. The student is an international officer who is taking a class in UAV test 
and evaluation. His job was a Ground Control Station Operator (GCSO) in his team. Also, he 
was a control officer operating F-16 Aircraft flying missions in Royal Bahrain Air Force 
(RBAF), so he got experience in real life for both situations. The first situation is operating F-16 
Aircraft by being in Ground Control Station (GCS), where the second situation is being an 
Operator of UAV during class flight test. 
The essential focus of my research and this interview was to understand and evaluate the 
relationship between Operator suspicion and physical system performance and many potential 
factors that impact while flying such as emotion, trust, cognitive ability, creativity, and 
situational awareness as show in figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Ground Control Station 
 
3.6 Interview Summary 
The interview was beneficial for me in an Operator position so I can understand the 
operator suspicion and trust. Also, I recognized from this interview that, the operators in the 
military, for example, receive training on the need for trusting the system as opposed to the 
necessity of creating suspicions that could be used to deal with possible threats that might affect 
the system. 
3.7 Analysis Approach to Focus and Supplemental Question 
The focus research questions (denoted as FRQ) that I focused on were as follows: 
 FRQ1: What is the significance of operator suspicion and the detection and response to 
cyber-attacks on unmanned vehicles? 
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This question was important to set the critical analysis in motion as it gave room 
for defining operator suspicion and its role in responding to cyber-attacks on unmanned 
vehicles. 
 FRQ2: How do trust and suspicion relate to each other? Are they at opposite ends of the 
same construct, or do they act independently of each other? 
These interlinked questions looked at the aspects of suspicion and trust as 
opposites of a construct that promote different ends in operator attitudes towards 
cybersecurity of unmanned systems. 
The other questions (denoted as SQ – Supplemental Question) that supplemented the 
FRQs went further to explore dimensions of suspicion theory with focus on an aspect that is 
pertinent to operators of the security systems. 
 SQ1: How do the dimensions of suspicion (uncertainty, malintent, cognitive activation) 
relate to operator performance?  Which dimensions have the largest impact on operator 
performance? 
These interlinked questions looked at three suspicion dimensions and established 
cognitive load as bearing greatest impact on operator performance. 
 SQ2: How do the dimensions of suspicion impact cognitive workload?  How is cognitive 
workload affected by suspicion, trust, and personality? 
Here, cognitive workload was explored deeper as a suspicion dimension that 
largely impacts operator performance and perceptions. 
3.8 Chapter Summary 
The methodology and design provided insights regarding the steps taken to establish 
different parameters related to operator suspicion as exemplified by the investigations and scores 
46 
 
on trust and uncertainty, among others. The model used provided a depiction and the platform for 
the analysis and its linkage to the theory of suspicion as the means of fostering improved 
monitoring and vigilance. The research design was adopted to ensure the ease of completing the 
study based on the use of human subjects in the experiment. The interview provided to evaluate 
the relationship between Operator suspicion and physical system performance, So Identifying 
cyber-attack is not easy at any jobs during observing operation. Also, the interview illustrated the 
analysis to the theory of suspicion as the means of encouraging improved observation. So, 
training Operators for situation awareness with the enhanced alert notification system can be one 
of the solutions to detect an early clue in any security job. 
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IV. Discussion and Analysis of Results 
 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
The research was designed to investigate the influence of operator suspicion in the 
detection and subsequent response to cyberattacks that unmanned systems are exposed to in 
various contexts. The research questions and hypotheses as established in chapter 1 provided the 
direction of the empirical testing based on the methodology outlined in chapter 3 with the 
experiments designed to probe the influence of operator suspicion as identified in each of the 
questions and hypotheses. The chapter offers an analysis and evaluation of the data from the 
research based on the responses of active duty Air Force officers who represent the operators of 
the Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs). The chapter highlights the findings based on the data 
generated from the experiments targeted at answering the hypotheses and research questions. 
4.2 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The research questions and hypothesis could be distinguished into two broad categories 
with one including those associated with the suspicion theory and its influence on operator 
detection and response to possible cyberattacks on unmanned systems and the second group 
including those related to the theory itself. The questions related to the theory of suspicion based 
on the actions of the operator are classified as focus research questions (FRQ) and hypothesis 
(FRH) as highlighted in chapter 1. The robustness of the experimental design facilitated the 
collection and analysis of data related to the theory of suspicion based on the supplemental 
questions and hypothesis denoted as SQ and SH respectively. The following two sections offer a 
discussion of the experimental findings from the two categories described based on the 
distinction of the research questions and hypotheses. 
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4.2.1 Analysis of the Focus Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The following focus research questions were applied regarding the suspicion theory in 
relation to operator detection and the subsequent response to cyberattacks on unmanned systems 
as denoted using (FRQ). 
1. FRQ1: What is the significance of operator suspicion and the detection and response to 
cyberattacks on unmanned vehicles? 
2. FRQ2: How do trust and suspicion relate to each other? Are they at opposite ends of the 
same construct, or do they act independently of each other? 
The research questions are subsequently linked to their focus hypotheses as shall be 
highlighted in this section.  
1. Focus Research Question 1 (FQR1): What is the significance of operator suspicion and 
the detection and response to cyber-attacks on unmanned vehicles? 
The research question was important in setting the critical analysis in motion as it 
provided the needed rom for the definition and understanding of operator suspicion and the role 
in the response to cyberattacks on unmanned vehicles. The performance was measured based on 
the distinct components that included Time and Score as each was recorded and calculated 
independently in the identification of the operator’s response to a particular mission. The Score 
offered a reflection of the decision-making component of the performance while the Time served 
as the reflection of the length of time required while arriving at the important decision to 
intervene.  
Summary of the FRQ1 Findings 
The results indicate that operator suspicion had a notable impact on the HMT 
performance as noted based on the focus research hypothesis (FRH), particularly FRH .1.1 and 
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FRH .1.2 on the detection of cyberattacks on UAVs and the speediness of the response to the 
suspicious activity. The results further indicate that the operators’ responses to tasks and response 
to sequence selections were linked to low performance based on the increased level of suspicion. 
Notably, the different cyberattacks and sentinel combinations were tested to assess the impact on 
the suspicion levels of the operators. The operators were strongly influenced by the likelihood of 
occurrence of sentinel and cyberattack activities as demonstrated in the findings of the study.  
 
4.2.2 Analysis of the Focus Research Hypothesis for Focus Research Question 1 
The hypothesis related to FRQ1 were denoted as FRH1 and included four hypotheses to 
identify various parameters of the study, including operator suspicion on the detection of 
cyberattacks on UAVs and the speed in the response to suspicious activities.  
FRH .1.1: Operator suspicion is significant in detection of cyber-attacks on UAVs 
According to Bobko et al., environmental cues are important in the trigger of the alert 
level and suspicion and can be classified as sentinel alerts as the operators become sensitive to 
abnormalities in the system. Bobko et al. indicates that negative discrepancies, distrust, and 
missing information are important factors that contribute to suspicion. Further, suspicion 
contributes to the greater search for information and the consideration of multiple ways that 
attacks can be perpetrated. I hypothesized that operator suspicion was significant in the detection 
of cyberattacks on UAVs. The findings from the correlation analysis indicate a positive Score 
that highlights the positive relationship between operator suspicion and the significance in the 
detection of cyber-attacks on UAVs. The results from the correlation analysis are presented in 
table 1 in the appendix and indicate a positive score of 0.57. The hypothesis FRH .1.1 was 
supported by the findings as suspicion was found to correlate at the 0.01 level to the detection of 
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cyber-attacks. The results are further supported by the interview I conducted as the respondent 
indicated that he felt suspicious despite the existence of firewall protections tin the system as part 
of human nature. Therefore, it indicates that suspicion is an important component in the detection 
of potential attacks on UAVs. This relationship was described graphically in Figure 3. 
 
PERFORMANCE AS A FUNCTION OF OPERATOR SUSPICION 
 
Figure 3: Graph of HMT performance as a Function of Operator Suspicion 
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FRH .1.2: Detection is positively linked to the speediness of response to the suspicious activity. 
Detection is an important aspect related to the response time required to deal with 
suspicious activities. It is important to note that cyberattacks are malicious, and hence require 
early detection as the means of ensuring measures are taken in a timely manner to avert possible 
calamities. Operator suspicion is linked to the greater search for information and the increase in 
the active procession of information that contribute positively to the operator response time. I 
hypothesized that detection was positively linked to the speediness of the response to suspicious 
activities. The results from the correlation table indicate a positive score for the time component 
indicating a direct relationship between detection and the timely interventions to avert 
cyberattacks. The direction of the relationship was negative implying that low detection impact 
delay in respond which can cause a disaster such as losing the UAVs and can link to adverse 
events as indicated in the results in table 1 in the appendix. This relationship was described 
graphically in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: Graph of HMT Performance as a Function of Time of Response 
 
2. FRQ2: How do trust and suspicion relate to each other? Are they at opposite ends of the 
same construct, or do they act independently of each other? 
The interlinked questions are important in exploring the various aspects of suspicion, 
including the identification of whether trust is an opposite construct that facilitates the promotion 
of different ends in operator attitudes towards cybersecurity of unmanned systems. The various 
components of suspicion were measured to determine whether they were at opposite ends of the 
same construct or they functioned independently. 
Summary of Findings for FRQ2 
The influence of suspicion and trust in determining the response of operators cannot be 
overstated. The two, suspicion and trust, are interrelated and do not act independently but rather 
are at the opposite ends of the same construct. Trust and suspicion are influential in the 
determination of the course of action that operators pursue regarding cyberattacks on unmanned 
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systems. The interview revealed some link between suspicion and trust as the respondent 
strongly reported that he did not trust the system at all based on the capabilities of hackers while 
further asserting that he was highly perceptive and suspicious as a human about the capacity of 
the protections for the system to avert cyberattacks. Similarly, the results from the correlation 
analysis signified the strength of the relationship between suspicion and trust.  
4.2.3 Analysis for the Focus Research Hypothesis (FRH) for FRQ2 
FRH.2.1: Trust and suspicion are related. 
FRH.2.2: They are inversely related as opposite ends of the same construct. 
For the two hypotheses, I sought to explore the relationship between trust and suspicion 
as exemplified by the first hypothesis where I hypothesized that trust and suspicion were related. 
The results from the correlation analysis indicated a positive relationship on the McShane scale 
while the Mayer’s scale indicated no relationship between trust and relationship. Trust Mayer’s 
scale yielded a negative figure of -0.076 compared to the positive score of 0.791 for the Trust 
McShane scale. The correlation scores indicate the summative effect being negative further not 
supporting the hypothesis as the trust and suspicion were not directly related but rather had a 
negative relationship.  
On the second hypothesis, a correlation that was greater than 0.90 indicating the inverse 
relationship between trust and suspicion of the same construct. The findings support the 
hypothesis and underline the trust and suspicion as being inversely related as the opposites of the 
same construct. This relationship was described graphically in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5: Graph of the Relation of Trust and Suspicion 
 
4.2.4 Supplemental Questions 
The other questions (denoted as SQ – Supplemental Question) that supplemented the 
FRQs went further to explore dimensions of suspicion theory with focus on an aspect that is 
pertinent to operators of the security systems. 
 SQ1: How do the dimensions of suspicion (uncertainty, malintent, cognitive activation) 
relate to operator performance? Which dimensions have the largest impact on operator 
performance? 
These interlinked questions looked at three suspicion dimensions and established 
cognitive load as bearing greatest impact on operator performance. 
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 SQ2: How do the dimensions of suspicion impact cognitive workload? How is cognitive 
workload affected by suspicion, trust, and personality? 
Here, cognitive workload was explored deeper as a suspicion dimension that largely 
impacts operator performance and perceptions. 
Related to the supplemental questions were the following hypotheses, marked as SH – 
supplemental hypothesis addressing the aspect of cognitive load in suspicion theory as per Gay, 
Horowitz, Elshaw, Bobko and Kim (2017), as well as Paul & Dykstra (2017). 
 SH.1.1: The three dimensions of suspicion negatively affect operator performance. 
 SH.1.2: Operator performance is largely impacted by cognitive load. 
 SH.2.1: Cognitive workload is increased by having to differentiate suspicion and trust. 
 SH.2.2: Personality of the operator towards being highly suspicious or highly trusting 
positively increase cognitive workload. 
Based on the regression analysis conducted the first hypothesis was on the three 
dimensions of suspicion having negative effects on operator performance. The results 
support the hypothesis and indicate partial support as the three dimensions of suspicion 
had some level of influence on operator performance based on the prevention of 
cyberattacks on UAVs. And the data collected was summarized in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Regression Analysis of the three dimensions of Suspicion on Operator Performance 
 
 
 Where, 
SSI_U: Uncertainty. 
SSI_C: Cognitive Activity. 
SSI_M: Perceived Malintent. 
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Similarly, the second hypothesis was supported as the cognitive load has a significant influence 
on operator performance. And the data collected was summarized in Table 3.  
Table 3: Regression Analysis of the Cognitive Load on Operator Performance. 
 
Where, 
TLX_Total_mean: The Cognitive Load 
 
The third hypothesis was not supported as Trust was not significantly related to cognitive 
load. This makes sense because if you trust an individual, you will not spend any time to 
cognitively analyze the situation or what you’re being asked to do. And the data collected was 
summarized in Table 4.  
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Table 4: Regression Analysis of the Trust to the Cognitive Load 
 
Where, 
TLX_Total_mean: The Cognitive Load 
On the other hand, the fourth hypothesis was further partially supported by the results of 
the regression analysis as suspicion was linked to the increase of the cognitive workload. Hence 
If you are suspicious of somebody, you will analyze everything they do and say before you 
decide to take action because you are unsure whether they have your best interest in mind. The 
more suspicious you are of somebody, the more time you will spend thinking about what actions 
are appropriate. And the data collected was summarized in Table 5. 
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Table 5: Regression Analysis of the Suspicion to the Cognitive Load 
 
 
Where, 
SSI_Total: The three dimensions of the suspicion theory (uncertainty, perceived malintent, and 
cognitive activity). 
 
4.3 Research Limitations 
As with other experiments, the study had its limitations, particularly the lack of a baseline 
to measure operator performance based on the scope of the research and limited resources. The 
results were largely inferential as there lacked the needed baseline to compare the results. The 
other limitation could be linked to the low sample size to provide results that could be 
generalized. The sample of N=256 and also the interview with just one person limited the 
possibility of the generalization of the findings. It was very hard to find a UAV operator to get an 
interview with because it is confidential job skills in the RSAF and USAF. 
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4.4 Chapter Summary 
The chapter presents the findings from the experiment component of the study that 
identified the connections between operator suspicion and the detection of possible threats of 
cyberattacks on unmanned systems. Some of the broad issues considered include the significance 
of trust and suspicion as the leading components that play an important role in the activities of 
operators who tend to the unmanned systems. The results support the literature regarding 
operator suspicion being important in the detection of possible threats and the part played in the 
timely intervention of some of the challenges faced on unmanned systems.  
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V. Conclusion and Recommendation 
5.1 Chapter Overview 
The chapter provides a summary of the dissertation by highlighting its purpose and scope 
in relation to the literature and findings. Further, the chapter discusses the research contributions, 
particularly related to the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) based on the experiment and the 
interview. Finally, the conclusion focuses on the future work as the means of extending the 
impact and relevance of the research. 
5.2 Review of Purpose and Scope/Summary 
As outlined in the research, the focus was on the establishment of the relationship 
between operator suspicion and the detection and response to cyber-attacks on unmanned 
systems. The different chapters from chapter 1 to 4 covered the introduction, literature, 
methodology, and discussion and analysis of results respectively. The research provided the 
background of the study based on previous studies as exemplified in the introduction that looked 
at the theories related to suspicion, theoretical model, and the research questions and hypotheses. 
The framework and background provided in the first chapter were important in the literature 
section that reviewed existing literature on operator suspicion and the link to the detection of 
possible attacks on unmanned systems. The third chapter described the methodology used in the 
research as the foundation for the interview and experiment based on the research questions and 
subsequent hypotheses.  
The importance and increased use of unmanned systems for security purposes, 
particularly in the military, contributed to the need for the research that focused on analyzing the 
cyber-attacks that are targeted at the cyber-physical systems (CPS) of unmanned vehicles. 
Significant research on the subject further contributed to the interest in the topic as the emergent 
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threats on unmanned systems have significant and catastrophic risks on security systems. 
Research has corroborated the importance of the topic as exemplified by the increment in the 
investments from the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) and United States Air Force (USAF) in 
unmanned systems used for armed attacks, border surveillance, reconnaissance, and 
transportation. Therefore, the findings from the previous research work served as the motivation 
for the study to analyze the effects of operator suspicion on the detection and response to cyber-
attacks. The need for the implementation of measures on the identification of the methods used 
by hackers in accessing unmanned systems has been highlighted as part of the motivation for the 
study.  
The research framework used places significant emphasis on the timely interventions 
based on suspicious activities that could threaten the functioning of unmanned systems. 
Therefore, based on the backing of research, it was important to explore the significance of 
suspicion in the military setting as operators in the military receive training that enhances the 
need for trusting systems as opposed to the creation of suspicion. The trust levels of military 
personnel in systems contributes significantly to the increase in the risks that unmanned systems 
are exposed to and reinforced the need for the research. The use of the suspicion theory was 
pivotal as the framework that can be applied in the exploration of the means through which 
operators detect and initiate response mechanisms to deal with cyber-attacks on unmanned aerial 
and ground vehicles. The issues highlighted, particularly regarding suspicion and trust in the 
military, contributed to the need for the research and the literature review to understand the 
application of suspicion theory in the examination of improvements that can be achieved in 
operator detection and the response to possible cyber-attacks on unmanned systems. The high 
mission demand and the subsequent operational tempo created limitations on the use of actual 
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Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Operators, but the use of literature and the emulation of the 
context were significant in the exploration of the possible solutions and the experiment. Research 
indicates that the majority of the cyber-attacks are not instantaneous and are characterized by 
resource-intensive and time consuming activities. Therefore, the understanding of the element of 
cyber-attacks contributed significantly to the research direction and experiment and the 
exploration of the security that could increase the preparedness of operators. The Suspicion 
theory as identified by Bobko was an important component of the theoretical model applied in 
the research targeted at the understanding of how operators detect and respond to cyber-attacks 
on unmanned systems.  
 
5.3 Research Contributions  
The effects of cyber-attacks on cyber-physical systems cannot be overstated with the 
emergent threats having significant impacts, particularly on security installations and missions. 
The topic has witnessed increased research attention in addressing the physical security aspects 
related to unmanned systems. Therefore, the research addressed the human component of cyber-
attack detection and response among operators, particularly in the military setting. The research 
combined aspects of trust and suspicion as the means of establishing the approaches that can be 
applied in the military setting to minimize the effects of adverse events related to cyberattacks on 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). The emphasis on trust in the impenetrability of systems has 
been identified to create challenges when dealing with unmanned systems as operators have low 
levels of suspicion and take long to respond to threats. The influence of suspicion in the timely 
response to threats cannot be overstated as operators initiate measures to deal with possible 
security breaches and inspection of threats.  
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The contributions of the research are significant in the training of situation awareness 
among operators. Notably, the research’ findings signal the importance of suspicion, particularly 
in the military setting as the means of reinforcing the timely response to possible cyber-attack 
threats. According to the interview, the experience of abnormal activities that includes the loss of 
communication and Global Positioning System (GPS) failure locations are some of the 
challenges that confront operators. From the operator’s perspective in the interview, it was 
evident that the loss of communication with the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) is a serious 
issue and could only be justified using assumptions. Notably, the operator indicated some 
concern about the failures being linked to possible cyber-attacks, and that enhances the 
significance of the research in highlighting the need for suspicion that can increase the chances 
of exploration of vulnerabilities. In the absence of suspicion, operators would fail to detect and 
implement measures to avert security threats associated with cyberattacks. Hence, suspicion 
creates the room for exploring different alternatives while investigating abnormal events as 
opposed to cases where operators trust the systems.  
The interview further indicated the absence of the required capabilities for the detection 
of cyberattacks. The research offers important contributions in the identification of the necessity 
of training of situation awareness for the operators to deal with the challenges identified in the 
interview regarding the absence of training to enhance awareness. Notably, the majority of the 
military training schedules emphasize on trusting the systems as opposed to suspicion that could 
be important in ensuring operators can detect and respond to cyber-attacks in a timely manner. 
Additionally, the experiment highlighted the significance of suspicion based on the component of 
time and the response to possible cyber-attacks.  
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The second contribution of the research can be linked to the building of a security system 
of notification and alerts that can be part of the cyber department of the Air Force. As identified, 
the Air Force is limited in its responses to possible attacks on unmanned systems that conduct 
important security operations. The capacity to minimize cyber-attacks can be linked to training in 
the Air Force and significance of trust in ensuring military operators are suspicious of the 
systems and can device measures to respond to possible security threats. My research targeted 
the reduction of the threats posed against cyber-physical systems, particularly the unmanned 
aerial and ground vehicle systems used by the Air Force.  
The findings from the research experiment, particularly the first research question 
indicated a positive relationship between operator suspicion and the detection and response to 
cyberattacks on unmanned vehicles. Additionally, the findings indicated an inverse relationship 
between trust and suspicions as being on the opposite ends of the same construct. The trust 
placed on systems contributes significantly to the lower rate of detection, and hence, the research 
contributes based on the recommendations for training among Air Force operators on the 
importance of suspicion in enhancing the detection and response to cyberattacks. The cyber 
department of the Air Force, should therefore, implement security measures to ensure the 
systems are designed to offer notifications and alerts based on possible cyber-attacks. The results 
based on the time indicate the necessity of initiating interventions that are time-conscious and 
contribute to the aversion of calamities. Trust and suspicion are important components that 
influence the reflection of the length of time required to initiate an intervention.  
The research can be implemented by the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) in its adoption 
and use of unmanned systems that serve different purposes. Hence, the Air Force shall benefit 
from the application of the research findings in the implementation of proactive training 
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measures for the situation awareness among its operators to be aware of possible cyber-attacks 
and the necessary responses. My research was uniquely designed where no one did that before in 
the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) because it offers the needed information to the Royal Saudi 
Air Force (RSAF) and sets the base for the organization to consider the impacts of the human 
factor in the sensitive area of operations. The research offers information that can be used in 
exploring the interventions that can be used to deal with the human factor in the monitoring and 
detection of strange activities that could reduce the efficacy of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
(UAVs) while completing a mission. The application of the findings by the Royal Saudi Air 
Force (RSAF) could reduce cases of cyber-attacks that could destroy costly machines, and also 
subvert the missions that the unmanned systems are deployed to complete.  
5.5 Recommendations for Future Research 
The study identified the need for additional research to support the findings regarding the 
need for operator training and awareness regarding the importance of the concepts of suspicion 
and trust in the detection and response to cyber-attacks on unmanned systems. Future research 
could focus on the effects of operator suspicion to the performance of the detection and response 
times without operator knowledge and the challenges faced by possible cyber-attack alert 
systems. Hence, future research could concentrate on the identification of the cyber-attack alert 
systems that could complement the human factors involved in the detection and response to 
cyber-attacks. The cyber-attack detection services are not currently available in the different 
Saudi Air Force unmanned system and could form the basis for future research that would work 
on the identification of the possible system responses. Future research should study the effects of 
suspicion and the consequences of operator performance on the enhanced performance measure 
where time is a factor. Additionally, another area of research could be the establishment of the 
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type of attack that corresponds to operator suspicion as the means of identifying defined training 
procedures.  
5.6 Chapter Summary   
The dissertation relied on literature, an interview, and experiment to investigate the 
emergent threat of cyber-attacks on unmanned systems, particularly in the military (Air Force). 
The nature associated with cyber-attacks indicates malicious intent and activities as highlighted 
by Bobko et al. based on the theory of suspicion. The Suspicion Theory offered the needed 
theoretical framework supporting the research in the investigation of the link between suspicion 
and the detection and response to cyber-attacks by operators in the military. One of the 
challenges addressed concerns the issue of trust that defines the interaction of Air Force 
operators with unmanned systems. The operators are trained to trust the systems, and therefore, 
fail to raise suspicion in the detection and response to cyber-attacks against unmanned vehicle 
systems. The research highlighted the significance of suspicion in enhancing the detection of 
cyber-attacks among operators in the military setting as the counter-measure to the concept of 
trust that defines the interactions of military personnel with systems. Operator suspicion forms 
the basis for recommendations regarding the need for training that enhances the awareness of 
operators to issues related to cyber-attacks. The propositions established in the research offer the 
needed information in the exploration of the link between trust and suspicion while dealing with 
the threats that unmanned systems face. 
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Appendix A. 
Reliability 
Scale: ALL VARIABLES   
    
Case Processing Summary 
  N % 
Cases Valid 256 100.0 
Excludeda 0 .0 
Total 256 100.0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
    
Reliability Statistics 
  
Cronbach's 
Alpha N of Items   
.752 8 
  
 
Scale: ALL VARIABLES   
    
Case Processing Summary 
  N % 
Cases Valid 256 100.0 
Excludeda 0 .0 
Total 256 100.0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
    
Reliability Statistics 
  
Cronbach's 
Alpha N of Items   
.866 18 
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Scale: ALL VARIABLES   
    
Case Processing Summary 
  N % 
Cases Valid 256 100.0 
Excludeda 0 .0 
Total 256 100.0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
    
Reliability Statistics 
  
Cronbach's 
Alpha N of Items   
.570 2 
  
 
Scale: ALL VARIABLES   
    
Case Processing Summary 
  N % 
Cases Valid 256 100.0 
Excludeda 0 .0 
Total 256 100.0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
    
Reliability Statistics 
  
Cronbach's 
Alpha N of Items   
.881 13 
  
 
Scale: ALL VARIABLES   
    
Case Processing Summary 
  N % 
Cases Valid 256 100.0 
Excludeda 0 .0 
Total 256 100.0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
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Reliability Statistics 
  
Cronbach's 
Alpha N of Items   
.839 6 
  
 
Scale: ALL VARIABLES   
    
Case Processing Summary 
  N % 
Cases Valid 256 100.0 
Excludeda 0 .0 
Total 256 100.0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
    
Reliability Statistics 
  
Cronbach's 
Alpha N of Items   
.604 2 
  
 
Scale: ALL VARIABLES   
    
Case Processing Summary 
  N % 
Cases Valid 256 100.0 
Excludeda 0 .0 
Total 256 100.0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
    
Reliability Statistics 
  
Cronbach's 
Alpha N of Items   
.251 2 
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Appendix B. 
Interview questions 
 
Q.1 Did you operate in Unmanned Vehicle and for how long? 
Yes, I have been operating UAV during on my class in AFIT at Area B runway for two days of 
flight test and two missions of 30 minutes of flying for each mission. 
Q.2 Did you experience any abnormal activities and behaviors during your job as an Operator? 
Yes, I have been experienced some abnormal activities such as losing communication and GPS 
failure locations. 
Q.3 What cause those abnormal activities form your understanding? 
I think that we lost communication because the codes that we wrote in the autopilot is not letting 
the UAV communicating with us. The second problem was the GPS is not working well during 
the mission. Those assumptions were discovered after the mission in the troubleshooting phase. 
Q.4 Can the cyber-attack be a suspicion threat in those cases? 
Yes, when those faults occur, I was not sure why the UAV is giving me those faults. A cyber-
attack can be a reason behind those abnormal errors. 
Q.5 What the capabilities of detecting cyber-attacks? If not, why? 
The truth is no capabilities of detecting cyber-attack immediately because we are not training of 
this kind of situation. Also, the ground control station (GCS) is not capable of detecting those 
kinds of attacks. 
Q.6 Do you trust your system which is the Ground Control Station software of communication 
and telemetry transfer between the UAV and GCS? 
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No, I don’t trust the system at all, because the capabilities of the hackers are unlimited from the 
news feedback all over the world about them. 
Q.7 Is there any notification or alarm regarding abnormal activities? 
Yes, there are notification and alarm in the mission planer program inside the GCS but without 
explaining what causes them to fail. 
Q.8 Do you feel suspicion even when there is firewall protection exist in the system? 
Yes, I always feel suspicion because it is my human nature. 
Q.9 when you were observing the operation, is cognitive that you provide in your task is for 
Maintenance failure or other things such as cyber-attack? 
I was only focusing on cognitive toward maintenance failure reasons. 
Q.10 Is workload can be a significant cause of low suspicion of cyber-attack and high trust of the 
system? 
Yes, I think that workload can be a major factor of causing low suspicion of cyber-attack and 
high trust of the system. 
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Regression  
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